Book Reviews. 529 tified by the contents. The writers actually dealt with are Newman, Martineau, Comte, Spencer and Browning; and it is impossible to conceive any impartial principle of choice or exclusion upon which this somewhat mixed company could be said to be or to represent the "leaders of religious thought in the nineteenth century."
The author does not make any claim to originality, except in some degree as regards the view taken of Browning's teaching, but, though not particularly novel, his expositions and criticisms are always presented in a clear, simple and interesting way. Perhaps the best of the critical chapters is that on Martineau, and with one line of thought in Martineau's religious philosophy the author connects what he has to say positively about the nature of religion (in the chapter entitled "What is Religious Experience?") This positive view he would describe as "Symbolism." "Every visible and invisible creature may become to us an appearance of God. . ..
The presence of God may be discerned in the manifold experiences of life, in different degrees and with diverse values; and the highest value as a Divine manifestation belongs to the Ideals which humanity forms, in advance of all its past experience and attainment" (p. 154). Such "Symbolism," we are told, must be distinguished from "Mysticism," which "has always supposed that the experience of God can only be reached by means which are independent of the ordinary experiences of life" (p. I56). And this is unquestionably an important distinction. But it is less clear how such "Symbolism" is to be distinguished from what may be called a Hegelian Positivism. It differs apparently from the Positivism of Comte in discerning the presence of God in nature as well as in humanity; but in proportion as the presence of God is held to be most clearly manifested in human ideals, this difference seems to become unimportant. Now when we speak of our consciousness of ideals as being the very presence of God in us, there is always the danger that this statement may be read from the other end. The presence of God in us, it may be said, is just another name for our consciousness of ideals. The symbol and the reality fall together, or we can distinguish the reality from this particular symbol only by saying that it has other symbols or manifestations. It is not easy to see how Mr. Mellone can logically get beyond this positivism or philosophical pantheism, or how the vague sentiment of the religious experience from which he starts can be prevented from shrinking up, when "interpreted" (to use his own expression), into just this philosophical doctrine, in which it seems to lose all its religious quality. Whether the critic is prepared to ascend to Dr. Oakesmith's doctrine, that "around Plutarch's Religion revolves his conception of life," or not, he must nevertheless acknowledge gratefully that this essay fulfills its purpose in an admirable way. The author endeavors "to ascertain, from Plutarch's own account of his views, the principles, the method and character of his Religion; to learn in what manner he conceives the supernatural world and its relation to the human mind and to human interests; to discover and illustrate the processes by which these results are obtained; to note their philosophic bearing and tendency; and to exemplify their application in the sphere of practical ethics." To this endeavor the author brings the qualifications of great learning, of careful study of both Plutarch and his critics, of genuine sympathy with, and consequent real insight into, the mind of Plutarch in its attitude towards the problems of his age. The result is an interesting and valuable picture of a man of good taste and great learning, who has no special philosophical school either to attack or to defend but soberly and with a sound mind tries to ascertain the true facts of life by diligent inquiry into the history of the past. "There was not a tendency of Greek philosophy with whose history and results he was not familiarly acquainted; there was not a school from which he did not borrow something for introduction into the texture of his own thought ;"-in other words, Plutarch was typically Greek in two characteristic aspects-as a disinterested seeker after truth, in his application of the maxim, "Moderation in all things," to every department of life and thought. The wealth of illustration with which Plutarch exemplifies or justifies his views makes the "Opera Morala" a mine of information upon the manner, beliefs, customs of a century peculiarly interesting alike to the profane historian and to the Christian student. It is by no means the least service rendered by this essay that it enables the "average
